THE INTERNATIONAL COURT AND RULE-MAKING:
FINDING EFFECTIVENESS

LEO PARK*

ABSTRACT
The International Court of Justice is often considered an aspiration. It exemplifies the struggle of international law to overcome
international politics and is viewed by many as having failed to
live up to its expectations. Nevertheless, its influential role in interpreting international law is far from merely academic. The
weight and respect its analyses are given result in not only a better
understanding of international law, but the development of international law as well. It is from this effort, intentional or otherwise,
that the Court has actually found a unique and unintended mechanism of effectiveness.
This Comment argues that despite the lack of authority to do
so, the Court creates international law, either by itself or with the
assistance of other international bodies. These new laws and obligations, in turn, inherently affect state behavior. While the majority of the Court’s criticisms center on its role as an adjudicatory
body, they overlook the possibility that the Court may have an influence beyond the states that are appearing before it in any one
case. Thus, by expanding the scope and understanding of how its
decisions operate, the Court can regain some of the power it has
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lost over the years. It gives the Court a method to be effective that
it can and should take advantage of.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.” or the “Court”) embodies an ideal. It was to be a forum through which states could
peacefully settle their disputes and where law and argument
would trump war and conflict. Coming off the heels of two World
Wars, such an idea had undeniable appeal. Very soon, however,
its ability to do so was questioned. Time has provided little comfort to the Court; its flaws have become ever clearer. Its availability
as a forum has not led to consistent or widespread use, and when
utilized, it is unclear how well the Court manages to settle the disputes before it. What this comment argues below, however, is that
regardless of the Court’s criticisms, it nevertheless is and can continue to be effective through its ability to shape international law
and the subsequent effects that it has on state behavior.
This comment first overviews the current criticisms leveled at
the Court, which have culminated in the general underuse of the
body. It then describes the active role the Court has played outside
the realm of dispute resolution and in the development of international law. This can be seen in the Court’s creation of legal principles or rules in the adjudication of a case that become directly incorporated in subsequent treaties. Additionally, the Court has
played an active role in furthering the body of customary international law by announcing that certain norms have achieved the status of custom or by applying new principles which are subsequently reiterated and reapplied by itself and other bodies. Finally, this
comment argues that this function and ability gives the Court a
level of effectiveness because of the effect the development of law
can have on state behavior. Through this, the Court has an avenue
to exert influence while circumventing much of the criticism leveled against it. Thus, the Court has a demonstrable power which,
if continued and used appropriately, will serve its initial aims of
maintaining peace and amicably settling disputes, despite the current international climate and any flaws in the Court’s inherent design.
2. CURRENT CRITICISMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.
Throughout its existence, the Court has been a frequent target
of criticism for its failures and shortcomings. Debate and contro-
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versy have surrounded the Court and its predecessor since their
inception, with even the name unable to escape scrutiny.1 A large
body of current criticism is leveled at both what disputes it can
handle and how it chooses to dispose of them. Many scholars
blame the Court’s underutilization, rightly or wrongly, on these
points. Ultimately, however, these criticisms inherently understand the Court as an adjudicative forum, which leaves open the
possibility of the Court’s success in other avenues.
A major point leveled against the Court is the consent-based
nature of its jurisdiction. For a dispute to be adjudicated, both parties need to consent to appearing before the Court.2 Otherwise, it
would stand for a usurpation of state sovereignty. Arguably, in
the early years states willingly gave up some of this sovereignty in
the hopes of a more ordered world, as was borne out by the relatively high levels of acceptance of I.C.J. jurisdiction at the time.3
Today, however, only 72 out of 193 UN states and 1 of the permanent members of the Security Council currently accept compulsory
jurisdiction.4 Two salient denunciations of the Court highlighted
this shift in attitude. The US withdrew its acceptance of jurisdic1
See Franklin Berman, The International Court of Justice as an ‘Agent’ of Legal
development?, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 7, 9 n.12 (Christian J. Tams & James Sloan eds., 2013).
2
See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36 [hereinafter I.C.J.
Statute]. Attempts were made to make universal compulsory jurisdiction part of
both the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of
Justice but failed due to opposition from the major powers. See J. Patrick Kelly,
The International Court of Justice: Crisis and Reformation, 12 YALE J. INT’L L. 342, 345–
46 (1987).
3 At one point, a majority of the members in the UN had accepted compulsory jurisdiction. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 348 (citing 1952-1953 I.C.J.Y.B. 171–82
(1953)).
4
See Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT’L
CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations [https://perma.cc/B55A6ECH] (last visited Feb. 20, 2018); States Entitled to Appear Before the Court, INT’L CT.
JUST.,
http://www.icj-cij.org/en/states-entitled-to-appear
[https://perma.cc/J8AN-FW7J] (last visited Feb. 20, 2018). There is, however,
some logic behind the argument that a more universal level of jurisdiction would
actually be detrimental to the Court. See Francisco Orrego Vicuna & Christopher
Pinto, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Prospects for the 21st Century, in THE
CENTENNIAL OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE: REPORTS AND
CONCLUSIONS 261, 354 (Frits Klashoven ed., 2000) (noting that the Court may already be overburdened with its current caseload and the increase caused by compulsory jurisdiction would be detrimental). This overview does not consider the
numerous other jurisdictional complications that exist, most notably the proliferation of reservations and conditional acceptances. See generally VANDA LAMM,
COMPULSORY JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014).
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tion in 1986,5 after the Court determined that it had jurisdiction to
hear and admitted Nicaragua’s claims against the US for its support of contra rebels during the Nicaraguan revolution.6 Similarly,
France withdrew its declaration after New Zealand brought suit
against it for its nuclear testing in the South Pacific.7 Beyond merely demonstrating the decline of the Court’s jurisdiction, these opportunistic withdrawals show the flaws in a system that is open to
such manipulation.8
At the other end of the adjudicatory process, the issue of generating compliance with the Court has also been a source of debate.
States are bound to abide by the decisions of the Court,9 but the
Court possesses no inherent enforcement measures. States can
turn to the Security Council to enforce judgments.10 However, the
UN Charter notes that the Security Council “may, if it deems necessary” take action, not that it must,11 and the power is one that,
while discussed, has never been formally invoked.12 Furthermore,
resort to the Security Council comes with its own set of criticisms
about the body’s institutional competency.13 While there have
been complaints filed with the Security Council about failures to
5
U.S. Terminates Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, 86 DEP’T ST. BULL.
67, 67 (1986).
6
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Jurisdiction of the Court and the Admissibility of the Application, 1984 I.C.J.
Rep. 392 (Nov. 26), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/70/070-19841126JUD-01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6YQ-LZ5Z].
7 See Kelly, supra note 2, at 349 (citing 907 U.N.T.S. 129).
8
Manipulation of the consent system is far from rare. Iran attempted to
withdraw its acceptance after the U.K. brought suit against it for nationalizing
British oil companies. Id. From an alternative perspective, Portugal at one point
accepted jurisdiction and then immediately commenced suit against India. See
LAMM, supra note 4, at 45 (discussing the Right of Passage case); see also Right of
Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Preliminary Objections, 1957 I.C.J.
Rep. 125 (Nov. 26).
9
10

U.N. Charter art. 94(1).
U.N. Charter art. 94(2).

Id. (emphasis added).
See CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 39 (2004) (noting that “the Security Council has
never actually founded measures to enforce I.C.J. decisions on Article 94(2).”).
There was discussion at the Security Council of enforcing the Nicaragua judgment,
but no action was taken. Id.
13
See generally Attila Tanzi, Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the International Court of Justice and the Law of the United Nations, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 539 (1995)
(analyzing the institutional capabilities of the Security Council in regard to enforcing I.C.J. judgments).
11
12
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comply with judgments, these may be better characterized as negotiation tactics rather than attempts to initiate enforcement actions.14
Compliance is not an uncommon problem, but it provides a
singularly unique issue for the Court. It is placed in a circular position since its method of resolving a state’s demonstrable failure to
fulfill its international obligations is by then creating another international obligation. The flaws in the system were illustrated by the
very first case the Court faced. After the judgment in Corfu Channel,15 it took nearly 40 years for Albania to pay the ordered compensation.16 While many maintain that compliance has generally
been good,17 instances of noncompliance persist18 and the fact that
it needs defending is a problem in itself.19
Beyond its competency as a judicial body, the Court has also
come under criticism as a political instrument.20 The Nicaragua
14
See SCHULTE, supra note 12, at 39 (characterizing the practice of filing complaints but not following through with requests for a Council meeting as a “strategy to urge compliance”).
15
The Corfu Channel Case (Alb. v. U.K.), Assessment of the Amount of
Compensation Due from the People’s Republic of Albania to the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 244, 260 (Dec. 15) (requiring
payment of £807,580 from Albania to the U.K.).
16
See SHABTAI ROSENNE & YAËL RONEN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 1920-2005, VOL. 1 THE COURT AND THE UNITED NATIONS 238–
39 (4th ed. 2006) (“On 8 May 1992 the British and Albanian Governments reached
agreement on the settlement of outstanding claims.”).
17
See Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of
the International Court of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 820 (2008) (“[D]ecreased hostility towards judgments rendered by virtue of compulsory jurisdiction is perceptible.”); Rosalyn Higgins, President, Int’l Court of Justice, Speech at the United
Nations University on “The ICJ and the Rule of Law” 6 (Apr. 11, 2007),
http://archive.unu.edu/events/files/2007/20070411_Higgins_speech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K4YN-RADY] (“Out of the 91 contentious cases that the Court
has dealt with since 1946, only 4 have in fact presented problems of compliance
and, of these, most problems have turned out to be temporary.”).
18 See Llamzon, supra note 17, at 825–44 (identifying five cases in which compliance was not achieved).
19
Cf. Higgins, supra note 17, at 6 (finding it necessary to explicitly note that
the Court’s decisions are legally binding and that compliance has been good despite “a widespread misconception” to the contrary); Frequently Asked Questions,
INT’L
CT.
JUST.,
http://www.icj-cij.org/en/frequently-asked-questions
[https://perma.cc/B79J-APGN] (last visited Feb. 20, 2018) (listing the binding
nature of the Court’s decisions as a frequently asked question).
20 See Upendra D. Acharya, ICJ’s Kosovo Decision: Economical Reasoning of Law
and Questions of Legitimacy of the Court, 12 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (2012)
(illustrating that one scholar even went so far as to characterize it as “a rubber
stamp for the dominant power of the Security Council and the judges’ national
political affiliations”); see also Shigeru Oda, International Court of Justice: Its Myth
and Reality, 51 JAPANESE Y.B. INT’L L. 427, 428 (2008) (noting that African states
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case shows the precarious political position in which the Court is
placed. In many ways, the Court gained legitimacy by ruling
against a world superpower,21 but during the process, it was further accused by that superpower of being used as a political tool.22
These concerns are not just recent, as the U.S. has had longstanding fears about the Court’s political implications.23 Going
even further, some doubt whether the Court is even in an appropriate position to deal with political issues at all.24 In their view,
certain disputes should be left to international relations rather than
international law.
Finally, there has been doubt leveled about the Court’s overall
impartiality. The Court is comprised of 15 judges, and, as a matter
of practice, each region of the world gets a number of judges that
largely mirrors the regional distributions in the Security Council.25
This creates a bias in favor of the five permanent members of the
Security Council who almost always have a judge present, and
wealthier states are generally more likely than poorer ones to have
a national on the bench.26 This can be problematic since a recent
study has shown that the judges have voting tendencies that favor
considered the Court a Western European body for many years).
21
See YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS
176 n. 91 (2014) (explaining that Nicaragua is considered by some to be a key case
where the Court gained the confidence of developing states).
22 See Mary Ellen O’Connell & Lenore VanderZee, The History of International
Adjudication, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 40, 59
(Cesare Pr. Romano et al. eds., 2013) (in withdrawing from the I.C.J.’s compulsory
jurisdiction, the U.S. said “the ICJ had been used as a political tool by Nicaragua”); U.S. Terminates Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 67.
23
See Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice: The Independence of the Court in its Constitution, in its Jurisdiction, and in its Application of
Law, 25 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 92, 115–16 (1931) (discussing the resistance of the
United States to advisory opinions by the Permanent Court of International Justice
because of their potential use as a political instrument).
24
See Gerry J. Simpson, Judging the East Timor Dispute: Self-Determination at
the International Court of Justice, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 330 (noting
that many lawyers and diplomats feel some issues are “simply too political” for
the Court to deal with). But see Andrew Coleman, The International Court of Justice
and Highly Political Matters, 4 MELB. J. INT’L L. 29, 41–43 (2003) (defending the
Court and exploring examples of when it was able to adjudicate controversial
matters).
25 See Eric A. Posner & Miguel De Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUDS. 599, 603 (2005) (discussing the distribution of judges); Kenneth Keith, The ICJ—Some Reflections on My First Year, 5 N.Z. J. PUB. INT’L
L. 201, 203 (2007) (“[T]he membership has for some time matched that of the Security Council . . . .”).
26 See Posner & Figueiredo, supra note 25, at 603.
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states that are more similar to their home state.27 Furthermore,
each state in a dispute has the right to have one of its nationals on
the Court, whether he or she is a current member or appointed ad
hoc for that proceeding.28 While the practice is not without justification,29 it has come to embody an intuitive understanding that
those judges will vote for their home state.30
These considerations culminate in a general criticism of underuse.31 While supporters note that the Court has become more
active,32 such statements, even if true,33 are not necessarily positive
indicators. The most notable countervailing consideration is that
the number of states that are party to the I.C.J. Statute has increased dramatically, with no equivalent increase in use.34 And,
symbolically, it remains largely underused by the major world
powers.35
27
See id. at 624 (“The data suggest that national bias has an important influence on the decision making of the ICJ . . . .”).
28 I.C.J. Statute art. 31(2)–(3).
29 The original justification for such an approach was to ensure the inclusion
of someone on the bench who understood the domestic legal systems and practices of each of the states before the Court. See Charles S. Deneen, The Permanent
Court of International Justice, 35 COM. L. LEAGUE J. 178, 180 (1930).
30
See Eberhard P. Deutsch, The International Court of Justice, 5 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 35, 37–38 (1972) (discussing the problem of judicial impartiality in international tribunals).
31
See Eric Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice 12–24 (John
M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 233, 2004) (attempting to
explain the disuse of the Court based on a number of criticisms it has faced, including some presented above).
32 See Peter Tomka, President, Int’l Court of Justice, Lecture at the Stockholm
Centre for International Law and Justice: The Rule of Law and the Role of the International Court of Justice in World Affairs 1–2 (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.icjcij.org/files/press-releases/9/17849.pdf [https://perma.cc/F966-6F3B]. And this
is certainly true when compared to the Court’s lows in the 1970s. See Oda, supra
note 20, at 428 (noting that at one point during the 1970s there were no cases before the Court); see also Christopher Greenwood, The Role of the International Court
of Justice in the Global Community, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 233, 234–35
(2011) (describing the low levels of use during the 1970s).
33
Perceptions of these trends can be skewed by symbolic acts such as the
large number of filings by Serbia and Montenegro in 1999 against the NATO
members. See generally List of All Cases, INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icjcij.org/en/list-of-all-cases [https://perma.cc/M75M-M4FH] (last visited Mar. 26,
2018).
34
See Posner, supra note 31, at 5 (discussing how raw data showing a recovery in I.C.J. usage does not take into account the large increase in the number of
states that are party to the statute); Tomka, supra note 32, at 2 (basing his praise on
the absolute number of cases).
35
See Posner, supra note 31, at 8 (noting that the only permanent member of
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The degree of influence and importance of these criticisms can
be debated, and the Court still has many ardent advocates.36 Nevertheless, their basic validity is compelling. However, in focusing
on the Court’s ability to adjudicate any given dispute, they fail to
consider that the Court’s current influence has spread beyond its
effects on a single case. Such influence can be felt through the
Court’s evolving role in the development of international law.
3. THE COURT HAS ACQUIRED AN INFLUENTIAL ROLE IN THE
FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY BOTH CREATING AND
REINFORCING SUBSTANTIVE RULES THROUGH ITS JURISPRUDENCE.

The Court is a key player in the development of the rules and
norms that govern international law, as evidenced by its practice
and the subsequent events that follow. This effect can be seen both
in the codification of the Court’s legal principles in treaties, as well
as in the Court’s influence in forming and developing customary
international law. Underlying its impact is the degree to which legal and judicial bodies take up the Court’s principles, even when
they are unsupported or controversial. As a result, the Court has a
practical effect on the creation of international law, despite its legal
inability to do so.
The Court’s judgments often influence the course of later treaties on the same topic. For example, the drafters of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties took heed of the Court’s jurisprudence in regards to treaty interpretation. Article 31 requires
that treaties be interpreted in accordance with their “ordinary
meaning . . . in the light of [their] object and purpose.”37 As the
commentary to earlier drafts shows, there was debate as to whether focus should be put on the treaty’s text or purpose.38 The decision to favor the text was supported in large part because of “the
the Security Council to accept general compulsory jurisdiction is the U.K.); see generally Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, supra note
4.
36
See, e.g., Llamzon, supra note 17, at 852 (arguing that criticism is unwarranted if expectations are managed).
37 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332 art. 31(1).
38 See Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 187
art. 27, cmt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/191 (noting that while a majority of jurists place
primacy on the text of the treaty, some allow for more liberal interpretations
based on the intention of parties).
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jurisprudence of the International Court [which] contains many
pronouncements . . . that the textual approach to treaty interpretation is regarded by it as established by law.”39 Although largely
considered a codification of established custom,40 the Convention
was under no obligation to follow settled law since it is an independently binding instrument. Consequently, the Court’s decisions can be seen as providing a legal framework to guide future
treaty developments and negotiations.41
Even when not codified, the Court’s pronouncements often exert significant influence on the development of customary international law. Most directly, the Court frequently announces that certain principles have achieved the status of custom. In Nicaragua,
for example, the Court announced that Common Articles 1 and 3 of
the Geneva Convention were, at that point, customary international law.42 Relatedly, the Court stated in its advisory opinion on the
Legality of Nuclear Weapons, that the principles codified in the foundational treaties of humanitarian law embodied custom.43 In that
same opinion, the Court noted that the doctrine of transboundary
harm—which requires states to ensure respect for the environment
of other states—was also customary international environmental
law.44 These declarations are noteworthy in that they were all
Id. art 27, cmt. 11.
See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, 46–47 (June 21) (describing the
provisions relating to termination that were being applied in that case as codifications of custom).
41 See Markus W. Gehring, Litigating the Way Out of Deadlock: the WTO, the EU
and the UN, in DEADLOCKS IN MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 96, 104 (Amrita
Narlikar ed., 2010) (arguing that the I.C.J.’s decision in the Nuclear Weapons case
was an effort to provide legal principles around which countries could negotiate a
nuclear non-proliferation treaty); Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International
Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 227, 228 (1994) (remarking
that developments in maritime law have had an impact on subsequent delimitation agreements between states).
42
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 113–15 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. At
least one commentator suggests that this case was the turning point for the Court
to a more active rulemaking function in its jurisprudence. Vicuna & Pinto, supra
note 4, at 350 (citing G. Abi-Saab: De l'évolution de la Cour Internationale: Réflexions sur Quelques Tendances Récentes, Revue Generale de Droit International
Public (1992) No. 2, 295).
43
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 257–59 (July 8).
44 Id. at 241–42.
39
40
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made with little to no support, relying mostly on principles derived from its own jurisprudence and not the inquiry into state
practice and opinio juris that custom requires.45
In addition to their announcement, many consider the Court’s
application of novel principles as a signal of their status and importance. This occurs regardless of the frequently unsupported nature of those rules. For example, in Nicaragua, the Court laid down
the groundwork for the doctrine of effective control for the attribution of the actions of non-state actors.46 Interestingly, the Court
provided no background or explanation. 47 Nevertheless, the rule
has become a solidified pillar of customary international law, as reflected in the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts48 and the Court’s choice to reaffirm the rule in the
Genocide case when its applicability was directly challenged.49 Additionally, the doctrine has been cited by numerous other tribunals,
including the American Court of Human Rights,50 the European
Court of Human Rights,51 and arbitral tribunals,52 and has been the
subject of much literature.53
45
See generally Nicaragua, supra note 42, at 97 (“to consider what are the
rules of customary international law . . . [the Court] has to direct its attention to
the practice and opinio juris of States”).
46 See id. at 65.
47 See id.
48
See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
2001 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 26 art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
49
See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007
I.C.J. Rep. 43, 209–11 (Feb. 26).
50
See The “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ¶ 97(d)–(e) (Sept. 15, 2005) (finding
that there was no effective control by the state).
51
See Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 30–31 (May 2,
2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-80830
[https://perma-archives.org/warc/5MCHADSW/20180404172943/http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-80830]; Al-Jedda v.
U.K., App No. 27021/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 56 (July 7, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105612
[https://perma-archives.org/warc/A5QY6YRD/20180404173421/http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105612].
52
See White Industries Australia Ltd. v. The Republic of India, Final Award,
¶
5.1.27
(Nov.
30,
2011),
http://arbitration.org/sites/default/files/awards/arb2811.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TR7F-TVJ7].
53
See e.g., Kjetil Mujezinovic Larsen, Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The ‘Ultimate Authority and Control’ Test, 19 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 509, 514 (2008);
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Similarly, in The Gabćíkovo-Nagymaros Project (“Gabćíkovo”), the
Court was tasked with determining the lawfulness of the diversion
of a river as a possible countermeasure.54 The Court cited three
sources in defining countermeasures; however, it then noted that
countermeasures had to be reversible in nature, a requirement absent from any of these sources.55 This was soon explicitly incorporated by the International Law Commission (“ILC”) in its Draft Articles on State Responsibility,56 which cites the Gabćíkovo case,57 and
is often mentioned when countermeasures are defined.58 This is
even more compelling because the Court only passingly mentions
the requirement without analyzing or applying it in any way.59
This effect has occurred even when the Court’s reasoning is directly contradictory to the requirements needed to establish custom. In The Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (“Arrest Warrant”), the
Court determined that foreign ministers received immunity, ratione
personae.60 By looking at the functions of the foreign minister as
Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, Reconstructing the Effective Control Criterion in Extraterritorial
Human Rights Breaches: Direct Attribution of Wrongfulness, Due Diligence, and Concurrent Responsibility, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 129, 137 (2014); Tom Dannenbaum, Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability: How
Liability Should be Apportioned for Violations of Human Rights by Member State Troop
Contingents Serving as United Nations Peacekeepers, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 114, 153
(2010).
54
See The Gabćíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovn.), Judgment, 1997
I.C.J. Rep. 7, 55 (Sept. 25).
55 Id. at 56–57.
56
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 48 art. 49(3). The article
uses slightly different wording, indicating that the countermeasure must “as far as
possible . . . permit the resumption of performance of the obligation.” Id.
57
See id. art. 49, cmt. 9; see also James Crawford (Special Rapporteur), Third
Report on State Responsibility, ¶¶ 330–31, UN Doc A/CN.4/507 and Add. 1-4 (Mar.
15, June 15, July 10, July 18, Aug. 4, 2000) (citing the Gabćíkovo case when recommending to the commission the inclusion of this article).
58
See Patricia Tarre Soser, Non-Recognition of State Immunity as a Judicial
Countermeasure to Jus Cogens Violations: The Human Rights Answer to the ICJ Decision
in the Ferrini Case, 4 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 809, 817, 819 (2012) (noting that the definition of countermeasures was announced by the Court and furthered by the
Draft Articles on State Responsibility and include a reversible element); Michael
N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response
Option and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L., 697, 714 (2014) (defining countermeasures as requiring reversibility and also citing the Gabćíkovo decision).
59 The Gabćíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 54, at 56–57 (“It is therefore
not required to pass upon one other condition, namely . . . that the measure must
therefore be reversible.”).
60
See The Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.),
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 1, 2, 22–23 (Feb. 14). The Court has typically been inconsistent in its use of state practice. See generally, A. Mark Weisburd, The Interna-
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opposed to taking any formal legal approach, the Court settled the
uncertainty in the field by adapting a practical approach to interpreting immunity.61 This directly contradicts the definition of custom, which requires an affirmative showing of state practice and
opinio juris. Despite this and the controversy surrounding the
rule,62 the ILC adopted this position via the same reasoning used
by the Court.63
The influence of these developments is underscored by the
general enduring impact of I.C.J. judgments. The Court itself relies
heavily on its own jurisprudence in the adjudication of cases and
does so even though its decisions are not meant to be afforded any
weight in the future.64 Acknowledging this, the Court has stated
that it would rely on its past decisions unless there were good reasons not to do so.65 Reiterating certain principles serves another
important function since the citation of even well-established principles “serve[s] usefully to affirm or clarify certain fundamentals of
the law . . . .”66
tional Court of Justice and the Concept of State Practice, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 295 (2009).
61
See The Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 60, at 22–23 (“In order
to determine the extent of these immunities, the Court must therefore first consider the nature of the functions exercised by a Minister for Foreign Affairs.”).
62
See generally Dapo Akande, Should the International Law Commission Overrule the ICJ in Its Articles on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction?, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/should-theinternational-law-commission-overrule-the-icj-in-its-articles-on-immunity-ofstate-officials-from-foreign-criminal-jurisdiction/
[https://perma.cc/GD4K7L5D].
63 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, art 3,
cmt. 5, U.N. Doc. A/68/10 (June 20, 2013) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on Immunity of State Officials From Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction].
64 See I.C.J. Statute art. 59.
65
See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Preliminary Objections, 2008 I.C.J. Rep.
412, 428 (Nov. 18) (“To the extent that the decisions contain findings of law, the
Court will treat them as it treats all previous decisions: that is to say that, while
those decisions are in no way binding on the Court, it will not depart from its settled jurisprudence unless it finds very particular reasons to do so.”); Land and
Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. 275, 292 (June 11) (“There can be no question
of holding Nigeria to decisions reached by the Court in previous cases. The real
question is whether, in this case, there is cause not to follow the reasoning and
conclusions of earlier cases.”); see also Tomka, supra note 32, at 7 (noting that the
Court “relies liberally” on its past case law); Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent
Court of International Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 245, 256–57 (1921) (remarking that, as
a practical matter, the Court would likely follow its own precedent).
66
Roger O’Keefe, Jurisdictional Immunities, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 107, 107 (Christian J.
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Other international bodies also rely heavily on the Court’s determinations. For example, in the 2012 dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the International Tribunal on the Law of the
Seas, the Court was cited forty-five times in the tribunal’s decision.67 Similar influence can be seen in other regional courts and
tribunals.68 The increased use of permanent regional and international tribunals has, in many ways, given the Court an additional
audience to whom its jurisprudence has value. Moreover, there is
the unsurprising citation of the Court’s jurisprudence by the states
participating in I.C.J. proceedings,69 as well as the respect afforded
to it more generally by states and private actors.70
Tams & James Sloan eds., 2013).
67
See Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl./Myan.), Case No. 16,
Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS Rep. 4. To be clear, this number includes citations in the opinion when the tribunal was explaining the two sides’ arguments as
well as its own position. Nevertheless, it still demonstrates the large influence
that the I.C.J.’s jurisprudence had in the proceeding.
68
See, e.g., Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, App. No. 35343/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶
105–08
(2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-158290
[https://perma.cc/85GC-WZJU]; Case C-162/96, A Racke GmbH&Co. v.
Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1998 E.C.R. I-03655 ¶ 50 (June 16), http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61996CJ0162&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/WC6Y-72BC]; Case Stated No. 1 of 2014, Attorney General of
the Republic of Uganda v. Tom Kyahurwenda ¶ 33 (E. Afr. Ct. of Justice, Arusha
App.
Div.
July
31,
2015),
http://eacj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/Democratic-Party-vs-2c-SG-REVISED-Draft-2-FINAL31-07-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS74-EGKP]; Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al.,
Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Motion Challenging Jurisdiction, ¶ 32 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia,
Mar.
22,
2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tdec/en/060322.htm
[https://perma.cc/EA79-QBGH].
69
See, e.g., Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶ 123 (Mar. 31), http://www.icjcij.org/files/case-related/128/128-20040331-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3FGA-UM53] (noting Mexico’s citation of previous I.C.J. case
law in support of its position).
70
See Tomka, supra note 32, at 7 (stressing how much the Court’s jurisprudence is relied upon by various actors); see also Hovhannes Nikoghosyan, International Court of Justice Ruling on Kosovo and the Ultimate Power of Precedence,
EDITION
(Sept.
15,
2010),
CAUCASUS
http://caucasusedition.net/analysis/international-court-of-justice-ruling-onkosovo-and-the-ultimate-power-of-precedence/ [https://perma.cc/DME2-LYFL]
(arguing that even if the I.C.J.’s decision on Kosovo’s independence is not binding, it would encourage similar secessionist acts based on its precedential value);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 103, cmt. b (1987) (noting that
the decisions of the I.C.J. “are accorded great weight”); TIMO KOIVUROVA,
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 78, n. 23 (Routledge, 2014)
(showing a scholar’s use of the Court’s language in the Nicaragua case to explain
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While the Court has become influential in its own right, in
many ways it owes its authority to the ILC who relies on its decisions. As evidenced above, the ILC frequently cites I.C.J. opinions
in the texts they produce.71 In turn, the ILC both promotes binding
treaties and creates nonbinding codifications of the law, which are
highly respected. By one author’s count, as of 2013, the Articles on
State Responsibility have been cited in over 150 international tribunals.72 Thus, the ILC provides an important avenue through
which the Court’s decisions can exert considerable influence.
The above is just a small sampling of areas which have felt the
Court’s impact.73 There is disagreement about the ultimate degree
and nature of the Court’s influence.74 But in the long term, the
Court’s judgments often do cause some change to the greater body
of legal jurisprudence. This ability creates a valuable opportunity
for the Court to exert influence on states and their behavior.
4. THE I.C.J.’S INFLUENCE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW SERVES AS A
MEANS OF AFFECTING STATE BEHAVIOR.
Intuitively, the furtherance of international law is a positive
development, but much of the focus is placed on the doctrinal influence of those developments and not on the larger significance of
an international legal principle).
71
The relationship is reciprocal as well, with both groups reiterating each
other’s positions. See Rosalyn Higgins, President, Int’l Court of Justice, Keynote
Address at the Sixtieth Anniversary of the International Law Commission 1–2
(May
19,
2008),
http://www.icj-cij.org/files/press-releases/8/14488.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TA67-3ZXX].
72
James Crawford, The International Court of Justice and the Law of State Responsibility, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
71, 81 (Christian Tams & James Sloan eds., Oxford University Press, 2013).
73
For a more complete accounting of other fields that the Court’s jurisprudence has developed, see generally THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (Christian Tams & James Sloan eds., 2013).
74
Some scholars, skeptical of the Court’s influence, note that the Court’s
pronouncements have little effect without subsequent action, whether it be reiteration or codification. See Berman, supra note 1, at 9 (arguing that examples of the
Court’s influence should actually be analyzed by looking at the other organizations and bodies that promoted the Court’s jurisprudence). On the other end of
the spectrum, some have said the fact that the Court “even deal[s] with [a] principle arguendo lends credence to it . . . .” Robert P. Barnidge Jr., The International Law
of Negotiation as a Means of Dispute Settlement, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 545, 569
(2013).
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the court as an international legal regime.75 In elaboration of this
point, this Section demonstrates that the Court’s law-making and
influencing ability is desirable because it gives the Court, as a practical matter, a level of effectiveness through its ability to shape
state behavior. The further development of international law is an
opportunity for the Court to lay down rules that states can follow.
This has value in the largely unlegislatable field and consent-based
system that is international law, and it both guides state behavior
directly and makes dispute settlement more attainable. Further,
the inherent nature of the method by which the Court’s determinations become law allows the Court to create legal principles that
command the authority of the rule of law. While the level of that
authority and influence is debatable, it does garner a degree of respect from states and further encourages their compliance. Thus,
the level of the Court’s effectiveness as it shapes state behavior is
impacted by both its ability to create law and the manner in which
that law is created.
4.1. The general creation of rules in the international realm modifies
state behavior.
The creation of any rule or law has inherent downstream effects on the actions of states. There can be little doubt that laws
have, in some way, an influence on behavior. In the earliest days
of international legal scholarship, laws were viewed as higher order obligations that required adherence by the laws of man and nature.76 While grandiose views of international law have been
75
See Laurence R. Helfer, The Effectiveness of International Adjudicators, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 464, 476–80 (Karen J. Alter et
al. eds., 2014) (analyzing the effectiveness of the Court by, in part, focusing on its
ability to influence legal norms); see generally THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 66 (describing the effects that the
Court has had on multiple fields of international law); Dr. Jorge E. Viñuales, The
Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Development of International Environmental Law: A Contemporary Assessment, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 232 (2008) (analyzing how influential the Court has been, and may continue to be, in developing
International Environmental Law).
76 See HUGO GROTIUS, PROLEGOMENA TO THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 11 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., The Liberal Arts Press New York 1957) (“Herein, then, is another source of law besides the source in nature, that is, the free will of God, to
which beyond all cavil our reason tells us we must render obedience.”) (internal
footnote omitted); see also EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND
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pushed aside,77 states continue to repeatedly reaffirm their desire
to adhere to the law.78 With this regard, statements are often
made—in extravagant terms—concerning the need for law for the
orderly functioning of society.79 While the degree of their effect
can be disputed, the mere addition or clarification of a rule changes
a state’s mindset or attitude about a particular activity.
This issue is compounded by the inherent nature of the international law. The baseline of the system is that all activities are legal,
and this Lotus Principle requires a rule to the contrary arise for an
action to be deemed unlawful.80 Thus, if no such rule exists, a state
is given free reign. When combined with the already scant amount
of laws and rules in the international arena,81 this doctrine gives
importance and influence to a body that can provide necessary
guiding principles.
In many ways, this parallels a behavioral bias favoring compliance.82 The idea of behavioral biases that shift state activity has
SOVEREIGNS 56, § 5 (1797) (“As men are subject to the laws of nature, . . . the entire
nation, whose common will is but the result of the united wills of the citizens, remains subject to the laws of nature, and is bound to respect them . . . .”).
77
See E.H. CARR, THE 20 YEARS CRISIS: 1919-1939, 163 (Palgrave Macmillan,
2001) (criticizing the conception of natural law since it can be cited to obey good
laws or disobey bad laws, and thus a theoretical analysis of compliance based on a
law being good or natural is unsustainable).
78
See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/01, ¶ 134(a), U.N. Doc.
A/Res/60/01 (Oct. 24, 2005) (reaffirming a commitment to international law);
Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States art. 14, 1949 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N
287 (“Every State has the duty to conduct its relations with other States in accordance with international law . . . .”); U.N Gen. Assembly, Request for the Inclusion
of an Item in the Provisional Agenda of the Sixty-First Session: The Rule of Law at
the National and International Levels, U.N. Doc A/61/142 (May 22, 2006).
79
See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 2 , U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004)
(the maintenance of peace “cannot be achieved [without] . . . legitimate structures
for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the fair administration of justice.”);
2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 79, ¶ 134(a); see also Deutsch, supra note 30,
at 37 (describing the statements of Dag Hammarskjöld to this effect).
80
See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept.7) (a
state’s freedom to adopt the principles it deems the most suitable is “only limited
in certain cases by prohibitive rules . . . .”). As an additional matter, the iteration
of this principle is a further demonstration of the Court’s large influence on legal
jurisprudence.
81
See Tomka, supra note 32, at 3 (noting that the unlegislated nature of the
field makes rules unclear).
82
The use of behavioral economic theories to understand state behavior has
become more common as of late. See generally Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty Design, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 309 (2013) (using
behavioral economic principles to analyze treaty options and differing levels of
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been promoted by many. Of relevance is the behavioral economic
idea of anchoring, which involves the creation of a reference point
that decision makers unknowingly shift their behavior toward.83
As some have noted, such biases can influence treaty design by affecting the way in which treaty negotiators debate and the positions that negotiators take.84 In an analogous way, the creation of a
new international rule anchors state mindsets toward behaviors
which—even with deviance—converge on that anchor.
Ultimately, the degree of any given rule’s influence can be disputed,85 but the mere addition or clarification of a rule, at the very
least, changes a state’s mindset or attitude about a certain activity.
Inherent in the often quoted86 and criticized87 idea that “almost all
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time”88 is the premise
that law has some uncertain influence. Thus, the additional creation of law by the I.C.J. does shift state behavior toward it, even if
not to full compliance.

formal commitment to treaties).
83
See Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and Economics, 55 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 421, 429–30 (2014) (discussing the benefits and challenges of extending
the behavioral law and economics approach to public international law).
84 See id. at 457–58.
85 See Hurd, supra note 85, at 391 (discussing the use of international law as a
“legitimating discourse”). In addition to the above influences of law, the managerial model assumes that states have “a propensity to comply.” Kal Raustiala &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 542–43 (Watler Carlsnaes et al. eds.,
2002). Constitutionalism does so as well in broad strokes, noting that international law takes a position of hierarchy that functions as an imperative norm that
guides daily activities. See Ian Hurd, The International Rule of Law and the Domestic
Analogy, 4 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 365, 391 (2015) (analogizing international
law to constitutional law). Under rational choice, compliance depends on the
benefits and costs. See Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, Rational Choice,
Reputation, and Human Rights Treaties, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1131–34 (2008); see
generally ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY (2008).
86
See, e.g., Dale G. Stephens, Coalition Warfare: Challenges and Opportunities,
82 INT’L L. STUD. 245, 252 (2006); Mattias Kumm, International Law in National
Courts: The International Rule of law and the Limits of the Internationalist Model, 44 VA.
J. INT’L L. 19, 23 (2003).
87
See, e.g., Rolf H. Weber, Future Design of Cyberspace Law: Laws are Sand
(Mark Twain, the Gorky Incident), 5 J. POL. & L. 1, 7–8 (2012); Wade Mansell, One Law
for All (Except for the United States of America), 9 Y.B. N.Z. JURIS. 1, 3 (2006).
88 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (1979).
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4.2. The Court has the flexibility to create these rules in a manner that
gives them value.
Beyond creating substantive law, the Court has flexibility to
craft rules in a legitimate or authoritative manner, furthering its influence on state behavior. While the mere existence of law has
beneficial effects, the nature of that law can also embody principles
to which states are motivated to adhere. There is support for the
idea that rules are followed not just because of their substance, but
also because of the respect garnered by them. In line with this
idea, one study has shown that a state’s compliance with international law is correlated with its domestic emphasis on the importance of the rule of law.89 Thus, a state’s attitude towards the
law plays a key factor in its decision to comply. This focus on the
quality of the law, as opposed to its substance, is by no means new.
Immanuel Kant urged for the creation of an international world
governed by the rule of law.90 This eventually evolved into a line
of thinking advocating that nations obey the law because to do so
is morally and ethically correct.91
In furtherance of this, the Court can develop laws in a way that
is respected under various theories of the law’s influence.92 Franck
advocates that a rule does not create compliance in and of itself but
that the legitimacy of the rule determines its level of authority.93
He bases his notion of legitimacy on four factors: the clarity of the
rule, its symbolic value, its conceptual background, and its conformity with the international system.94 The first three, the Court
89
See Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and
Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819, 829 (2000)
(examining patterns of commitment to and compliance with international monetary law).
90
See Karol Kuźmicz, The Kantian Model of the State Under the Rule of Law, 19
STUDS. LOGIC, GRAMMAR & RHETORIC 13, 23 (2009) (summarizing Kant’s philosophy and examining his ideals).
91
See Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2611 (1997) (examining the history of scholarly efforts to answer the question of why nations obey international law, and arguing that the reason is closely
related to the managerial and fairness approaches).
92
Some have praised the use of the Court for this function. Leo Gross, Underutilization of the International Court of Justice, 27 HARV. INT’L L. J. 571, 571 (1988).
93
See THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24–26
(1990) (arguing that nations comply with rules “[b]ecause they perceive the rule
and its institutional penumbra to have a high degree of legitimacy.”).
94 See id. at 52, 92, 152–53, 184.
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can navigate easily. First, the clarity of the rule is in the Court’s
complete control.95 Second, the symbolic value can be achieved by
the inherent nature of the Court as a permanent and universal institution.96 As Judge Greenwood has advocated, the Court is in
many ways one of the most universal international legal bodies.97
Even discounting the inherent symbolism of the Court, it is merely
an impetus for a larger process. It is with further codification, citation, and reiteration that the rule then solidifies. Thus, the symbolism comes not just from one body announcing a rule at one instance. Instead, it is the result of a collective understanding that
develops among states, scholars, and the ever-widening number of
judicial tribunals.
Third, the conceptual background is again something in the
Court’s control. By ensuring that the rules it lays out are well reasoned and grounded properly,98 it can, at the very least, create the
appearance of conceptual validity.99 This can be seen in the Court’s
jurisprudence in the Arrest Warrant case. As described above, 100 it
extended a customary international legal principle to provide immunity for heads of foreign ministries. While such a rule was not
supported by affirmative state practice or opinio juris, the Court
came to its conclusion via a conceptual analysis of immunity and
the principles underlying it. Thus, the Court gave the rule validity
95
The lack of clarity is often a criticism leveled at the Court. See KAREL
WELLENS, NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:
A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 320–21 (2014) (noting the problems that arise in implementing the Court’s judgments when its determinations are unclear); MICHAEL C.
DORF, NO LITMUS TEST: LAW VERSUS POLITICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 195
(2006) (describing the uncertainty as to what degree the I.C.J.’s decision in the Arrest Warrants case gives foreign ministers immunity). Inherent in these criticisms
is the belief that the Court can be able to perform better in this regard.
96 See Berman, supra note 1, at 20 (explaining that the creation of the Court as
a permanent international legal body meant that it embodies a qualitative change
to the system).
97
See Christopher Greenwood, The Role of the International Court of Justice in
the Global Community, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL. 233, 241–42 (2011) (discussing the characteristics that set the I.C.J. apart from other international legal bodies).
98
Much of this argument proceeds under the assumption that the Court
would not aggressively radicalize its jurisprudence. The incremental nature of its
changes is an important part of retaining legitimacy and avoiding resistance from
states. See infra Part V.
99 See generally Niels Petersen, Lawmaking by the International Court of Justice—
Factors of Success, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1295 (2011) (describing that in different situations, different amounts of justification are needed).
100 See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
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that it may or may not have deserved.
Finally, conformity with the international system is more difficult. The entire benefit of the Court’s creation of legal rules is that
it does so in spite of the international system that has held it back.
In many ways, the rules it creates without state consent are usurpations of state sovereignty. If done properly, however, the Court
can avoid the ire of states and promulgate rules without, or at least
before, state resistance becomes apparent.101
Distinct from Franck’s notions of legitimacy, many scholars
have attempted to analogize domestic theories of the rule of law to
the international plane.102 These theories have numerous facets
and implications, but the ultimate point of relevance is that a system governed by a prescribed set of laws would follow those laws.
One scholar summarized the necessary elements for establishing
the rule of law as: 1) the rules should be stable; 2) they should apply equally to the governed and the individual; and 3) and they
should be applied indiscriminately.103
Working under this paradigm, the Court can achieve all of
these ends. The rules the Court promulgates become stabilized as
it and other tribunals repeatedly cite them. This is bolstered by the
fact that it would be hard-pressed to find a substantive field in
which the Court has overruled itself,104 which in some ways makes
See infra Part V.
See Hurd, supra note 86, at 366–67 (stating “[t]he rule of law is central to
both the conception of the modern state and to the study of international law and
international politics.”); Higgins, supra note 17, at 2 (looking to the definition of
rule of law for a domestic lawyer to define rule of law in the international context).
103 See Hurd, supra note 86, at 369. Hurd, analyzing numerous different conceptions of the rule of law, considers the differences to be minor. Id.
104
There are certainly procedural fields in which the Court has been inconsistent. For example, as the Court has some flexibility in determining the Standard of Proof, there has been inconsistency in these outcomes. See Rosalyn Higgins, President, Int’l Court of Justice, Speech to the Sixth Committee of the
General Assembly 4 (Nov. 2, 2007), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/pressreleases/3/14123.pdf [https://perma.cc/QVR6-596S]. It has only on one occasion
definitely addressed the standard of proof to be applied in that case. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 49, at 129. In other instances, the language it has used has often been contradictory, even when dealing with similar topics. For example, the Court mentioned “clear evidence” to prove attribution in Nicaragua but then “balance of evidence” to prove it in the Oil Platforms case. Compare Nicaragua, supra note 42, at
62, with Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, 189 (Nov. 6).
Nevertheless, these procedural rules before the Court are of little relevance in affecting state behavior in the greater international field, which is where this paper
focuses.
101
102
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the Court’s jurisprudence more stable than most domestic systems.
In regard to the final two points, the Court certainly can promulgate rules that apply to all states regardless of status or power.
And while the Court may only be applying the law to the two parties before it (who are admittedly from a limited group), a rule’s
importance is less embedded in the nature of any one case; it is in
its eventual solidification as custom, which, by definition, applies
equally to all.
Beyond these conceptualizations, others have noted that it is
not just the validity of the rule but also its adaptability and applicability to the current world that gives it value.105 In some ways,
their argument mirrors that of Franck; a rule that is outdated and
inapplicable has no legitimacy. From that perspective, the Court’s
ability to create rules that are pertinent in the moment has extreme
significance. It is here that the Court’s adjudicatory function actually serves it. By dealing with factual disputes before it, the
Court’s decisions are inherently impugned with a sense of applicability and currency. And when faced with a novel situation, the
Court has not shied away from making practical decisions adapted
to the scenario instead of doctrinally stagnant ones.106 When combined with the Court’s already universal nature,107 its decisions can
embody those principles of adaptability that give them added
worth.
Accordingly, the Court’s pronouncements of law, if crafted
well, can affect state behavior by possessing legitimacy and relevance. This is by no means intended to say that these rules will
then be complied with unwaveringly. It can be debated to what
degree a rule, even if legitimate, would be followed.108 And, fur105
See Sompong Sucharitkul, The Role of International Law Commission in the
Decade of International Law, 3 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 15, 16 (1990) (describing “current
state of international law must reflect the existing needs and prevailing conditions
of the contemporary world which is admittedly pluriform”); see also Jacob Katz
Cogan, Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 189, 205
(2006) (arguing that certain situations of noncompliance are beneficial to update
rules that are out of date).
106 See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
108 For example, the managerial model assumes that states have “a propensity to comply.” Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 86, at 542–43. Constitutionalism
does so as well, in broad strokes, by noting that international law takes a position
of hierarchy that functions as an imperative norm that guides daily activities. See
Hurd, supra note 102, at 391. Rational choice would depend on the benefits and
costs. See Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, Rational Choice, Reputation, and
Human Rights Treaties, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1131–34 (2008); see generally
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ther, this is not to say the Court has necessarily always created law
in the proper fashion. In the views of some the Court has long
been “an instrument for applying Euro-centered inherited international law.”109 However, what this and the above Sections are
meant to illustrate is not necessarily that the Court has been perfect
in execution. Instead, it demonstrates that it has the capacity to be
effective as an institution despite the structural and design criticisms mentioned earlier. Thus, the Court need not be constrained
by those criticisms as it moves forward and tries to achieve its original goals and mandate.
4.3. The further development of rules assists in the resolution of
disputes.
Furthermore, the creation of laws by the Court serves the additional purpose of encouraging the settlement of disputes when
they arise. Legal claims made in both public and private are an essential part of international relations and politics. As one author
puts it, “[t]he use of international law as a legitimating discourse is
pervasive . . . .”110 The law serves a key role in the negotiating process. Mark Weller, who participated in the negotiation process between Serbia and Kosovo, noted that international law was “a
background and structural factor that sets the conditions as to how
negotiations are approached.”111 Illustrative of this, Mareiek
Wierda, while analyzing peace negotiations in Afghanistan and
Uganda, noted that the rise of international criminal, humanitarian,
and human rights law did or could have had a positive impact on
those negotiations and the possibility of reaching sustainable settlements.112
While the weight in any given negotiating setting will often
ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY (2008).
109 Vicuna & Pinto, supra note 4, at 351 (internal quotations omitted).
110 Hurd, supra note 86, at 391.
111
Veronica Glick, The Role of International Law in Negotiating Peace, ASIL
(Apr. 10 2015), https://www.asil. org/blogs/role-international-law-negotiatingpeace [https://perma.cc/J5DA-ZQSP]; see also WELLENS, supra note 96, at 22 (describing that the prospects of legal success affect the nature of negotiations).
112
See Marieke Wierda, The Positive Role of International Law in Peace Negotiations: Implementing Transitional Justice in Afghanistan and Uganda, in LAW IN PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS 281, 283–284 (2d ed. 2010).
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depend on the nature of the rules and context, there are certain
underlying principles that a more robust legal framework promotes. With more rules in place, a state’s violation becomes more
definitive. They lose their ability to make an argument in good
faith that they believe they are complying with international law.
Thus it can limit “the positions [states] may credibly take during
negotiations by devaluing those that would be untenable . . . .”113
Therefore, it is clear that a victim state’s rights are being infringed.114 This hurts the state’s overall legitimacy and the public
sentiment towards that state,115 and more directly, it puts the state
in an instantly worse negotiating position.116 Additionally, the victim state would then become more willing to utilize countermeasures if it has a viable legal argument to justify these measures.117
The importance of this avenue is readily apparent. Negotiation
serves as one of the principal avenues of dispute resolution in today’s international climate, and any influence the Court can exert
on improving this process will have profound effects.118
That said, when considering the role of the Court from this international relations standpoint, the Court has the ability to influ113
Charney, supra note 41, at 228. Charney was speaking of the effect of the
law on treaty negotiations, but the situation is analogous in that it similarly affects
the manner in which negotiators try to reach a resolution.
114
See Julia Bedell, Field Report, On Thin Ice: Will the International Court of
Justice’s Ruling in Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening End Japan’s Lethal
Whaling in the Antarctic?, COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 8–9 (2015) (describing how I.C.J.
decisions provide incentives for states to comply and prevent future disputes with
other countries in the region and providing, as an example, the Sipadan-Ligitan
case); see also WELLENS, supra note 95, at 79 (remarking that resolution of certain
"test cases" makes it easier to negotiate and settle subsequent similar cases).
115 Bedell, supra note 116.
116
See Greenwood, supra note 32, at 249 (discussing the analogous situation
of the Tehran Hostages case, whereby the judgment played a role in rousing international sentiment against Iran). The analogy of course has its limits, since in that
case there was a judgment and it was well after the Court proceeding that a resolution was reached. Nevertheless, the resolution of that dispute seems less like a
situation about compliance and more akin to a larger negotiation between two
parties that implicated I.C.J. jurisprudence. See also SCHULTE, supra note 12, at 172
(noting the importance of the judgment in generating support and pressure
against Iran).
117
Countermeasures are an omnipresent element of international relations,
underlying state behavior as regards their international obligations.
See
BARNIDGE, supra note 74, at 562 (noting that countermeasures are meant to assist,
rather than an impede, negotiation and settlement of disputes).
118
See Tomka, supra note 32, at 8 (describing the importance of negotiations
and stating that the Court already plays a role in managing tensions to avoid escalation of disputes).
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ence the outcomes of disputes by facilitating information transfers.
Relations between states are, ultimately, interactions with imperfect information.119 One of the utilities of an international legal regime is to facilitate mutual understandings of norms and information.120 This can facilitate agreements among states,121 and more
generally, help guide behavior by allowing states to better understand each other and the decisions they are likely to make.122 Consequently, the Court’s ability to set down a more clear and robust
legal framework may aid more generally in information transfer
because it provides a baseline notion of legality to which state actions can be compared. The reasoning, or lack thereof, that states
use to comply with or defy a law forces them to provide information about their beliefs and motivations. As a result, when looking at international law as one of the means by which states may
better resolve their disputes with each other, the Court’s ability to
further that body of law provides a use that is independent of its
ability to actually force compliance with those laws.
As demonstrated above, the Court’s creation of law is a method
through which it can affect state behavior. Most certainly, the rules
it has announced have already had an effect. If the Court can continue to create rules in the proper fashion as to guarantee their legitimacy, it can take further advantage of this opportunity and expand its influence.
5. THE COURT CAN STILL BE EFFECTIVE DESPITE THE EVOLVING
NATURE OF ITS ROLE.
All of this, of course, puts the Court in a slightly precarious
place. The Court has no inherent authority to do this and has explicitly denounced its function as a law developing body.123 The
119 See Robert O’Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT’L ORG.
325, 338 (1982) (citing imperfect information as a reason why international regimes are valuable).
120 See id. at 341–45.
121 See id. at 349.
122
See JAMES D. MORROW, ORDER WITHIN ANARCHY: THE LAWS OF WAR AS AN
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION 16–17 (2014) (describing international law from a
game theory perspective as an equilibrium that states can use to understand other
states’ behaviors).
123
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 53,
http://www.worldcourts.com/icj/eng/decisions/1974.07.25_fisheries1.htm
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history of the I.C.J. Statute also shows a desire to avoid giving the
Court the power to create law as opposed to merely apply it. Article 59 of the Court's statute was not originally present in the draft
statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice
(“P.C.I.J.”).124 The Council of the League of Nations inserted such
language because it wanted to emphasize that the Court is not a
law-making or law-creating body.125
But can the Court do this? And, moreover, should it? The
Court, by overstepping its authority, is taking inherent risks.
While any individual judgment would still have binding effect,126
there is the possibility of undermining the Court’s authority as a
whole. This may cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Court’s rulings and further discourage states from utilizing the Court.127
While these concerns are understandable, they are unwarranted or
overstated, since the Court will better achieve its larger goals and
state resistance is likely to be minimal or ineffectual.
5.1. The Court has a degree of inherent authority.
The Court’s authority should not be read so narrowly as to preclude an expanding role. The I.C.J. and the P.C.I.J. were influenced
by the arbitral proceedings from which its roots are laid.128 At the
same time, however, the Court was given a qualitatively different
function with the inclusion of its advisory capability to answer
“any legal question.” It would be hard-pressed to expect that such
a power would not, in some way, start to expand into the realm of
[https://perma.cc/7NK8-56G4] (“In the circumstances, the Court, as a court of
law, cannot render judgment sub specie legis ferendae, or anticipate the law before
the legislator has laid it down.”).
124
See Rudolph Bernhardt, Article 59, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 1231, 1233 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds.,
2006).
125
See id.; see also I.C.J. Statute art. 38 (listing the authorities that the Court
can apply and not mentioning any authority to create law).
126 See U.N. Charter art. 94(1).
127
See Deutsch, supra note 30, at 39–40 (recounting the opinion of the Soviet
representative to the U.N. in 1970 who believed that the underuse of the Court at
that time was due to the Court’s “erroneous decisions”); see also Weisburd, supra
note 60, at 370–71 (criticizing the Court’s methodology for finding custom and attributing to it the Court’s decreased use).
128 Berman, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that a “continuous line of development”
can be seen from the Permanent Court of Arbitration).
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the progressive development or crystallization of customary international law, at least at the fringes.129 This notion of the Court’s
function has its supporters. Lauterpacht, for one, advocated significantly for an expanding role of the Court.130 Even those who find
that the Court’s role is to settle disputes do not deny that the Court
has a role in the development of law in the process.131
Further, the Court’s statute may have envisioned a restrained
role, but the Court, more generally, was intended to create order
and peace.132 Records from the San Francisco Conference specifically indicate that the Court was to “play an important role in the
new Organization of nations for peace and security.”133 Its ability
to do so has been severely hampered by the nature of the international system that it was meant to function within and the lack of a
legislative body whose rules it was supposed to interpret and apply. To better achieve that goal, the Court should have the authority to expand its mandate, at least to a degree.
As Lauterpacht noted, bodies “set up for the achievement of
definite purposes grow to fulfill tasks not wholly identical with
those which were in the minds of their authors at the time of their

129 See Russell D. Greene, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 7 B.U. L.
REV. 181, 189 (1927) (remarking in 1927 that the P.C.I.J. was already beginning to
develop a large amount of international law); see also Hudson, supra note 65, 256–
57 (reasoning that the same judges ruling on similar cases would be likely to
gradually create a body of law).
130
See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 6–7 (1958); The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company (Belg. v. Spain), Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, 1970
I.C.J. Rep. 65, 78–80 (Feb. 5), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/50/05019700205-JUD-01-04-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/JHT9-YESJ] (advocating that international law in regards to corporate entities is deficient and the Court should
not prevent a broader principle to be applied in that case); see also The Corfu
Channel Case (Alb. v. U.K.), Individual Opinion by Judge Alverez, 1949 I.C.J. Rep.
39, 40 (Apr. 9) (arguing that the Court has gained the role of actively developing
international law).
131
See Berman, supra note 1, at 11; see also Deneen, supra note 29, at 180 (explaining his opinion in 1930 that the Court would likely develop precedent); Higgins, supra note 71, at 1 (remarking on the I.C.J.’s position developing law while
settling disputes); Tomka, supra note 32, at 10, 12 (noting the influence of the
Court’s decisions on developing law).
132
It serves the same overarching functions as the UN it is a part of. See
Gunther Doeker, International Politics and the International Court of Justice, 35 TUL. L.
REV. 767, 773–774 (1960).
133
Shabtai Rosenne, On the Non-Use of the Advisory Competence of the International Court of Justice, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 32 (1963) (citing Report of Committee
IV/1 of the San Francisco Conference).
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creation.”134 The Court’s own jurisprudence advocates for this as
well. It has recognized that international bodies possess certain
implied powers or abilities to better achieve their ends,135 one notable example of which was the Reparation case where it found that
the UN had international legal personality.136 Although slightly
self-serving, applying a similar understanding to the Court buoys
its expanding role in developing international law. By providing
guidance on the law, even if in a different manner than intended,
the Court has an opportunity to reposition itself to serve its original and ultimate function better.
5.2. The Court’s actions can be achieved without resistance.
Even if the Court’s development of international law would be
viewed negatively by the states it was trying to help, pursuit of this
path would, if crafted correctly, be unnoticeable or at least unresisted. The nature of the Court’s rule-making lends itself to go on
unnoticed. The Court could avoid much criticism since it would
not necessarily be its job to completely and unequivocally establish
a rule of law. Instead, it would merely lay the groundwork for
other bodies, such as the ILC and other tribunals, to further solidify
its presence. The rules that it would be establishing, in order to be
well grounded in logic and reasoning, could not be extreme in any
event. Thus, there would be an inherent avoidance of drastic and
noticeable.
Moreover, if the Court were to establish these rules strategically, it could further avoid the resistance of the majority of states; it
could limit its determinations to more discrete cases between two
parties that do not readily appear to have larger implications. For
example, the Court, when faced with treaty interpretation issues,
frequently expounds on the underlying general principles of customary international law before delving into the treaty itself.137
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 131, at 5.
See MOHAMED SAMEH M. AMR, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AS THE PRINCIPAL JUDICIAL ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS 130 (2003).
136
See id.; Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 174, 177–79 (Apr. 11, 1949), http://www.icjcij.org/files/case-related/4/004-19490411-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CK8K-AGCR].
137
See Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, First Report on Formation and
Evidence of Customary International Law, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/663 (May 17,
134
135
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And even if the Court were to use a more widely known case as a
vehicle, it could avoid attention by making pronouncements of law
unrelated to the controversy at hand. For example, the Court, in its
Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, noted that the doctrine of transboundary harm was a part of customary international law regarding environmental damage. 138 While certainly related to the use of
nuclear weapons and the radiation they create, that was by no
means the issue of greatest concern.
Ironically, what this also means is that the Court’s advisory
function, as a general matter, is actually a poor vehicle from which
to pronounce new principles of law. The generalized nature of the
opinions means that they will have implications on major world
powers139 or the interaction between the Court and the other bodies of the UN.140 Furthermore, they are often on some of the more
political issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict141 or Kosovo’s declaration of independence.142 Thus, the nature and subject
matter of the Court’s advisory opinions have a tendency to generate much more attention.143 While there are exceptions,144 this
means that those opinions are generally less susceptible to this lawmaking approach, and the Court should focus more on individual
disputes.
The use of these disputes is all underscored by the fact that for
2013) (describing the different ways customary laws can be used in a situation
even when there is a treaty present).
138 Supra note 43–44 and accompany text.
139 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 42 (analyzing the general legality or illegality of nuclear weapons). In fact, this is likely
the only way the Court directly affects the rights and obligations of the major
powers not subject to I.C.J. jurisdiction.
140
See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
supra note 136 (finding the UN had legal personality).
141
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136 (July 9, 2004),
http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TK3B-HFK6].
142 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403 (July 22,
2010), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/83B3-XNKD].
143 As evidenced by the great amount of literature written about the Palestine
Wall opinion. See David Breau, The World Court’s Advisory Function: “Not Legally
Well-Founded,” 14 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 185, 185–86 (2006) (chronicling
the various criticisms leveled at the Court’s opinion in that case).
144
See supra note 43–44 and accompany text (noting the Court’s pronouncement of transboundary harm as custom in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion).
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a Court’s pronouncements to be invalidated, it would require the
active resistance of states. As an example of this, one member of
the ILC adopted the immunity for foreign ministers mentioned
above,145 not because he or she thought that the Court’s decision
made the rule customary international law, but because no state
had opposed the rule after its announcement and they felt it was
thus appropriate to include as progressive development.146 In
many ways it turns the paradigm on its head, requiring state action
for disapproval and allowing inaction to be a tacit sign of approval.
When analyzing this situation under the different models of
state behavior, these factors support the efficacy of such an approach. The incremental change in jurisprudence directly reflects a
historical institutionalist theory through which change happens
over time without anyone noticing. Furthermore, the lack of state
action needed supports acceptance under a liberalism model, since
the intricacies of domestic coordination are made irrelevant, and
under a behavioral model, which biases in favor of the Court’s
rules being accepted because the status quo from the state’s perspective is not resisting.
Finally, under a rational choice model, a state, having assumed
it noticed the rule being formed and overcame its inactivity bias,
would also have to realize that the rule would be detrimental to it.
Unless a state were actively involved in an endeavor that the rule
made problematic, the state would likely not resist unless it could
actively and accurately predict its future problems. Thus, the state
would only want to resist the rule when a dispute arose, and if the
rule has firmly solidified by that time, it would be difficult for the
state to claim the rule never existed in the first place.
5.3. The Court’s more active role is supported by the influence of the
other non-state entities involved.
Even if state resistance is present, it is blunted by the changing
audience the Court is now addressing. As described above, the influence of much of the Court’s jurisprudence is not through the independent affirmations of states. Instead, it is through other
courts, legal bodies, and scholars, whom states interact with tanSee supra note 63 and accompanying text.
See ILC Draft Articles on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction art. 3, cmt. 5.
145
146
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gentially. In many ways, these bodies are less concerned with
whether the Court has usurped a state’s sovereignty and are instead focused on the nature of the rule and principle. This is evidenced by the fact that they have been willing to include and further principles created by the Court that had little or no support
from state practice, such as the effective control doctrine. What
this demonstrates is the symbiotic relationship that these bodies
have with each other and the benefits that can be gained from it.147
Having different bodies, like the I.C.J, the ILC, and regional courts,
with different functions and mandates all promoting the same rule
helps create an understanding and support for that law without
any need for direct state involvement. And while the multiple
bodies also create risks of fragmentation within the law, that becomes the lesser of two evils, since it, at the very least, means the
law is progressing and adapting instead of stagnating.
This is not to say that states are to be disregarded. After all,
without states bringing cases before the Court, this is all for
naught. Nevertheless, such a situation seems unlikely. First are
the considerations described above, whereby states are not likely to
notice the Court’s changes until it is too late. But, furthermore, the
Court has already been engaging in this endeavor. It has already
been creating law, and the judges have even made public statements to that effect.148 Nevertheless, the Court’s docket is still burgeoning to a degree,149 if not to the extent many had envisioned
originally. Thus, the steady stream of cases which the Court can
adjudicate shows that risks related to the further loss of the Court’s
legitimacy should not be overstated.
The interplay of these factors and the Court’s ability to withstand institutional evolution has already been previously demonstrated by it and its predecessor. When the P.C.I.J. was first created, its competency to provide advisory opinions was questioned.150
Despite authority from Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, strong opposition to its advisory function, especially from
147
See Higgins, supra note 71 (applauding the relationship between the ILC
and the I.C.J., as each promotes the others work).
148 See Higgins, supra note 71, at 1; Tomka, supra note 32, at 10, 12.
149 See Tomka, supra note 32, at 2 (stating that the Court “has delivered more
judgments over the last 23 years . . . than during the first 44 years of its existence“).
150
See MAHASEN M. ALJAGHOUB, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1946-2005, 19 (2006) (discussing opposition to
granting the PCIJ any right to give advisory opinions).
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the United States, prevented its inclusion in the Court’s statute.151
Nevertheless, the Court was undaunted, laying down twentyseven advisory opinions in its eighteen-year life, including its very
first case.152 With its ability to play such an established role, when
the I.C.J. Statute was being drafted at the San Francisco Conference, most parties, including the US, did not oppose such a function,153 even though they had a clean slate to work with.
6. CONCLUSION
The Court has an opportunity. By creating international laws,
it has a means to influence state behavior, and it has found, whether inadvertent or otherwise, a method by which it has and can continue to be effective. This leaves unanswered, however, whether
this is the “right” thing to do. The Court is largely overstepping
states’ original vision of it, creating the law instead of just applying
it. But the Court was also meant to have an important influence on
the international world, both symbolically and practically. It has
not been able to do that, however, falling victim to the stagnation
which is, unfortunately, the norm rather than the exception in international law. When a body so significant finds a way to gain the
effectiveness that it lost (or maybe never had) it seems better to err
on the side of progress rather than restraint, even if that means the
Court that was meant to uphold the law, now has to bend it.

151
See id.; The Covenant of the League of Nations art. 14,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art14
[https://perma.cc/N9EC-WP2U] (last visited February 25, 2018).
152 See ALJAGHOUB, supra note 151 at 22.
153 See id. at 28 (“Even the US, despite its previous attitude towards the advisory opinions of the PCIJ, consented to such a function . . . .”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

